Technology · Explained
Researchers publish security analysis of Bitcoin's SHRINCS proposal
A 131-page review examines SHRINCS, a hash-based Bitcoin signature proposal, and asks the community to look for flaws.
Key takeaways
- Security estimate. The analysis puts classical security at 121.4 to 122.7 bits, subject to three unproven conjectures.
- Size trade-off. Stateful signatures range from 548 to 4,619 bytes; the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes, versus 64 bytes for Schnorr.
- Wallet risk. Stateful one-time keys require careful state tracking; reuse could allow forgery and theft, so wallets may need automatic fallback.
What happened
Mikhail Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography researcher at Blockstream, announced the first version of a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS on Thursday, Bitcoin Magazine reported. The analysis is dated Nov. 18 and was produced with Blockstream research director Jonas Nick and other collaborators, according to Decrypt. The draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal for SHRINCS remains open for comment, and the authors are asking engineers, cryptographers and protocol developers to review it.
SHRINCS is a hash-based signature proposal that uses SHA-256, tying its security to primitives Bitcoin already relies on rather than the elliptic-curve mathematics behind current signatures. It combines two spending paths under one key: a stateful design built on FXMSS with WOTS+C and a stateless fallback built on SLH-DSA. Because both paths use the same hash function, the security proof has to cover both, Kudinov said, according to Bitcoin Magazine.
The analysis estimates classical security of 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS, but those figures depend on assumptions that include three unproven conjectures. Kudinov said the work is not finished. The team is still analyzing a property called SM-DSPR, whose bound has been conjectured, and is working to tighten a reprogramming step and improve a bound against quantum attackers. The authors say the analysis has not received enough peer review, and the project's GitHub repository warns that the documents may contain errors and should not be the only basis for deployment.
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Why it matters
The work lands as quantum risk gains attention. A global group of securities regulators warned this week that moving blockchains to quantum-resistant cryptography may be especially difficult, and researchers recently built a post-quantum defense for the Lightning Network after Bitcoin's first quantum-safe transaction was shown without a fork. SHRINCS is presented as a conservative option because it relies on SHA-256, but its trade-offs reach Bitcoin's block space and wallet design. Nick warned that widespread use of the larger signatures could mean fewer transactions per block and an uncertain fee market, affecting how many people can use Bitcoin and, in his view, the network's value proposition.
What the data shows
Signature size is the main cost. Under the draft proposal, stateful SHRINCS signatures range from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes. By comparison, Schnorr signatures on Bitcoin today are 64 bytes, and ECDSA signatures typically come in around 71 bytes. Signatures take up scarce block space, so larger ones reduce the number of transactions that fit in a block. The compact stateful path relies on one-time keys; if a wallet reuses one, an attacker can forge a signature for that address and steal funds. Wallet software therefore has to track the state of every key, while the stateless path avoids that risk at a much larger size.
Background
SHRINCS is one of several efforts to prepare Bitcoin for a future in which quantum computers could threaten existing signature schemes. Hash-based signatures are attractive because their security rests on hash functions, which Bitcoin already uses. SHRINCS borrows from SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA, and the team produced two results that are not specific to SHRINCS: a classical bound for a property called ITSR without reprogramming and a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability. Kudinov said those results also apply to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA and were published as separate papers. The SHRINCS working group includes researchers backed by nonprofits including Brink and OpenSats, Decrypt reported.
What to watch
Reviewers will focus on the unproven conjectures, the SM-DSPR analysis and the quantum-attacker bound. Wallet developers face the practical task of enforcing the stateless fallback whenever a state counter could be compromised; Nick said it must be impossible for users to trigger the catastrophic reuse case. The draft BIP's comment period and future wallet specifications will show whether the ecosystem accepts the size and operational trade-offs. Nick also noted that optimizations of both signature paths are advancing with AI-assisted research, Decrypt reported, leaving room for the cost picture to change.
Questions readers ask
What is SHRINCS?
SHRINCS is a proposed hash-based post-quantum signature scheme for Bitcoin. It combines a compact stateful path and a larger stateless fallback under one key.
Why are the signatures larger?
Hash-based signatures require more data than elliptic-curve signatures. The draft sets stateful SHRINCS signatures at 548 to 4,619 bytes and the stateless fallback at 5,777 bytes, compared with 64 bytes for Schnorr.
What is the main wallet risk?
The stateful path uses one-time keys. Reusing a key could let an attacker forge a signature and steal funds, so wallets must track key state and fall back to the stateless path when necessary.